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Abstract
The planned movement to the origin principle with the cross-border pre-tax system on a full-
scale would lead, ceteris paribus, to changes in VAT revenues in the individual EU countries.
For instance, the member countries with trade surpluses and higher VAT rates would be
significantly better off. For this reason, a clearing mechanism is necessary to rectify this type
of revenue imbalance among the EU nations. The introduction of the Single Market in 1993
appears to have further encouraged firms’ and households’ evasive behaviour in paying VAT
in the EU. In order to estimate its relevance, this study quantifies the annual amount of
hypothetical VAT revenues for the individual countries on the basis of the national accounts
data. The relation between the calculated hypothetical and the (current) collected revenues in
a fiscal year largely determines the extent of VAT evasion of a country when the time-lag
problem between the creation of tax liability and the VAT collection in cash terms can be
adjusted. The macroeconomic clearing is supposed to take place based on the share of
hypothetical revenues of the member countries. Consequently, such a system seriously suffers
from the adverse incentives for the individual nations since countries with a lower evasion
ratio than the weighted average of all EU countries would lose the VAT revenues, whereas
those with a higher evasion ratio would gain.
JEL Code: F02, K42, O17, H25, H26, H87.
Keywords: VAT evasion, EU single market, origin and destination principle, hypothetical
VAT revenues macroeconomic clearing national accounts. 
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Despite the introduction of the Single Market and the abolition of border controls, the
so-called destination principle still dominates in the EU, particularly concerning the
application of value added tax (VAT) on the commodity trade between the member
states. The transitional arrangement existing since the beginning of 1993 is planned to
be completely replaced by the so-called origin principle with the cross-border pre-tax
refund system.
1 “Border controls have [traditionally] been an important cornerstone of
the European VAT system, since they [have] provided evidence of border-crossing
transactions, thus verifying the entitlement for zero-rating upon exports as well as the
obligation to pay import VAT” (Genser, 2002, p. 3). By contrast, the origin principle
has largely been applied for the cross-border shopping of private households in the EU.
2
For instance, consumers pay VAT of the origin country. EU citizens have been carrying
out this type of trade without any quota restriction since 1993.
Ceteris paribus the planned movement to the origin principle with the cross-border
pre-tax system on a full-scale would, however, lead to changes in VAT revenues in the
individual EU countries. For instance, those member countries with trade surpluses (i.e.
higher export volumes) and higher VAT rates would be significantly better off. For this
reason, a clearing mechanism is necessary to rectify this type of revenue imbalance
among the member states in the case of implementing the origin principle to collect
VAT in the EU (Dziadkowski, 1997). Even though all the EU members have the same
VAT rate, the clearing mechanism still appears to be necessary as long as net exports
among countries differ (see Figures 1 and 2). According to the work programme devel-
oped by the European Commission for a common VAT system in 1996, the sum of
VAT revenues collected by national authorities is anticipated to be redistributed to the
national treasuries by a supranational apportionment of EU-wide VAT revenues ac
                                           
1  The transitional VAT regime has been criticised mainly for three reasons: “(i) VAT regulations on
supplies and acquisitions of firms residing in different EU countries deviate from VAT regulations for
transactions among resident firms. This asymmetry causes non-symmetric compliance costs which
have been regarded as an untenable violation of the concept of a genuine single market and create a
border tax burden [that] discriminates against intra-community trade [...]. (ii) The deferred payment
system breaks the VAT chain at a very vulnerable stage, [for example] at the borderline of domestic
and foreign tax administration. This weakness in VAT control may be exploited by VAT frauds, given
the fact that in the EU there is a permanent and huge flow of commodities which circulate free of VAT
after the export VAT rebate in the exporting country has been granted and before the deferred VAT
payment in the importing country becomes effective. (iii) Differing national VAT rates provide incen-
tives for price arbitrage to consumer and for strategic VAT rate competition among EU governments,
which lead to unintended and undesirable revenue shifts between national treasuries as a consequence
of strategic undercutting of VAT rates” (Genser, 2002, p. 6).
2  There are some exceptions to this general rule, as the destination principle is still applied for special
regimes including household purchases of new motor vehicles, mail ordering, etc.3
cording to national accounts data. There have already been several attempts aimed at
examining the possibilities of VAT clearing in the EU on the basis of such data (Nam,
Parsche and Schaden, 2001).
3
Figure 1 Intra-EU Trade and Destination Principle
Source: Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Although there are debates about the definition of tax evasion and the shadow economy,
both seem to be increasing steadily in the EU (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider,
2000b; Lubell, 1991; OECD, 1997).
4 In particular, the burden of direct and indirect
                                           
3  Theoretically the VAT clearing based on intra-EU trade statistics would be the correct method. Yet
such an approach would suffer from the low quality of relevant data collected in the context of one EU
market.
4  The definition of shadow or hidden economy has always been a controversial issue in the academic
discussion (see e.g. Schneider and Enste, 2000; Lippert and Walker, 1997; Mogensen et al., 1995; Lu-
bell, 1991; Feige, 1989; Frey and Pommerehne, 1984). One commonly adopted working definition is
that “the shadow economy is market-based production of goods and services whether legal or illegal,
that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP.... [Apart from the illegal activities it also] in-
cludes unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either monetary or barter
transactions, hence all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to the
tax authorities” (Schneider and Enste, 2000, p. 79). The definition often varies depending on the se-
lected method of measurement: Schneider and Enste (2000) primarily concentrate on legal value-
added creating activities which are not taxed or registered, while the study made by Andreoni, Erard
and Feinstein (1998) exclusively deals with tax evasion and avoidance. In the former study, for exam-
ple, unpaid household production, voluntary non-profit services and criminal activities are excluded
from the analysis.
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taxation, the complexity of the entire tax and social transfer system as well as the inten-
sity of government regulation have been empirically identified as the major causes of
encouraging such illegal or hidden economic activities (Lippert and Walker, 1997;
Johnson, Kaufmann and Schleifer, 1997; Frey, 1989; Frey and Pommerehne, 1984; De
Gijsel, 1984; Riebel, 1983; Schneider and Neck, 1993; Tanzi, 1982). To a certain ex-
tent, the implementation of the Single Market appears to have increasingly stimulated
firms’ and households’ evading behaviour with regard to paying value added taxes in
the EU Member States.
5 
Figure 2 Intra-EU Trade and Origin Principle
Source: Ifo Institute for Economic Research
In other words, the abolition of the border controls for intra-EU trade accompanied by
the less well-established administrative co-operations of the (rather problematic) nation-
specific EDP (electronic data processing) control systems has probably provided further
opportunities to easily implement their VAT evasion efforts in the EU (Gebauer et al.,
2002; Parsche, Steinherr and Waller, 1996).
6
                                           
5  In OECD countries general consumption taxes, especially value added tax (VAT), are among the fast-
est growing revenue sources, together with contributions to finance social security. The former tax
item produced ca. 18% of total tax revenues in 1998, compared with only 12% in the mid-1960s
(OECD, 1999).
6  VAT control is still a national task in the EU. Yet the Commission is highly interested in effective
taxation and control in all member states, since VAT contributes to the EU budget. Today, the need for
Country A Country B
Standard VAT rate: 16%
Exports are subject to tax




+   8
VAT revenues
50 + 10







Clearing according to destination principle
Standard VAT rate: 20%
No border control
Company B Household B
Government B
VAT revenues
16 + 8 10 + 20 16 10
Monetary flow Trade Flow5
Different types of empirical methods have been adopted to measure the size of tax eva-
sion and the informal economy, which range from a direct survey to a sophisticated,
dynamic econometric model. All these methods have both advantages and shortcomings
(Schneider, 2000a and 2000b; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Lippert and Walker, 1997;
Feige, 1989). According to Schneider (2000a) and Thomas (1992), these approaches
have a three-fold differentiation:
•  micro approaches based on surveys (e.g. about income declared for tax purposes)
among taxpayers and tax auditing (Isachsen, Klovland and Strom, 1982; Mogensen,
Kvist, Körmendi and Pedersen, 1995),
•  macroeconomic approaches calculating the differencies between income and expen-
diture statistics (MacAfee, 1980; Del Boca, 1981) as well as between the official (i.e.
registered) and actual labour force (Contini, 1981); the monetary approach based on
the Fisher quantity equation (Feige, 1996); the popular currency demand method
measuring the correlation between the currency demand and the tax pressure (Tanzi,
1982); and the physical input method observing relations between (official and unof-
ficial) GDP and electricity consumption (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996; Johnson,
Kaufmann and Schleifer, 1997; Lacko, 1998), and
•  (dynamic) multiple-indicator and multiple-cause econometric models which consider
various macroeconomic determinants for creating a shadow economy (i.e. the burden
of taxation and regulation, tax morality, etc.) and attempt to explain their effects in
the development of production, labour and money markets simultaneously (Aigner,
Schneider and Ghosh, 1988; Schneider, 2000a; Frey and Weck-Hannemann, 1984).
Unlike the larger share of conventional empirical analyses which emphasise the pre-
dominance of direct taxation and measure the total size of tax evasion for the entire do-
mestic economy of a country, this study deals with the narrow aspect of tax evasion in
the specific area of EU value added taxation. On the basis of national accounts data, one
can estimate the annual amount of hypothetical VAT revenues of the individual EU
countries, which are assumed to be the maximum level of VAT revenues the country
                                                                                                                               
audits under the transitional VAT system is much greater than before 1993, when cross-border trans-
actions were interfered with border controls. However, insufficient financial resources are presently
provided by the individual countries for this purpose. In addition, EU Member States have kept their
own (nation-specific) VAT control methodology in spite of the creation of the internal market. Fur-
thermore, some countries and regions are unwilling to improve tax controls, for this could reduce
competitive advantages of indigenous firms against those foreign companies with higher tax compli-
ance. Nowadays, the tasks regarding the administration and control of VAT matters are increasingly
transferred to local and regional authorities. Emphasising the so-called subsidiarity principle, this de-
velopment can be positively interpreted as a necessary measure to enhance control efficiency, since the
local authorities have better information about local taxpayers. On the other hand, such an assignment
could more easily lead to permitting tax evasion and fraud on the local level (Europäische Kommissi-
on, 1995, 1997 and 2000).6
can ideally collect in a fiscal year. When the mismatch in timing between creation of tax
liability and VAT collection in cash terms can be adjusted, the relation between the hy-
pothetical and the (current) collected revenues indicates the tax collection performance
of a country, from which the extent of VAT evasion and fraud (as well as suspension of
tax claims caused by bankruptcies) can also be derived for the same country. Further-
more, the macroeconomic clearing is supposed to take place based on the share of hy-
pothetical revenues of the individual countries. Yet the macroeconomic clearing system
seriously suffers from the adverse incentives for the individual EU Member States,
since countries with a lower VAT evasion ratio than the weighted average of EU 15
would lose VAT revenues, whereas those with a higher evasion ratio would gain
through such an EU-wide redistribution system. 
Method of Calculating VAT Evasion Based on National Accounts Data
As mentioned above, this study primarily compares the difference between the hypo-
thetical and the collected VAT revenues in a given fiscal year to determine the extent of
VAT evasion and fraud in each EU country. The latter can be easily obtained from the
official statistics, while the former should be estimated for comparison purposes. For the
calculation of the hypothetical VAT revenues of a country, national accounts data and
input-output tables published by the national statistical office, annual reports of various
state-owned companies and other relevant statistics are adopted as the VAT base.
7 In
particular, the statistics and data on private consumption, intermediate consumption and
investment of central and local governments (mainly for acquiring real estate, buildings,
machinery, instruments etc.) apparently play the most important role for the assessment,
together with those on the business performance of banks and insurance companies
which are not entitled to deduct input VAT.
                                           
7  To a significant extent shadow activities are currently included in the national accounts of the individ-
ual EU countries. Yet the methods for correcting official statistics for this purpose still vary from one
country to another. The European System of Accounts (ESA) of 1995 prescribes adopting all possible
approaches to quantify (implicit and explicit) additions so that illegal and hidden economic activities
can be exhaustively included in GDP. Even if this goal were achieved, the exact share of shadow ac-
tivities would not seem to be easily identified. In general, national statistical offices can hardly provide
detailed information on the part of GDP attributed to these shadow activities. Only some sector-
specific, explicit additions are relatively well captured in the relevant statistics and can be separated
rather easily. There is no doubt that the major share of VAT evasion in the areas of private consump-
tion as well as intermediate consumption and investment of governments and other specific sectors
like banks and insurance companies, non-profit private institutions, etc. which are not entitled to de-
duct input VAT is included in the macro-economic aggregates. This study aims at identifying the
scope of VAT evasion hidden in the national accounts data.7
Prior to the adjustment of the time-lag between the creation of tax liability and the
real tax collection (see below), the hypothetical VAT revenues of a given fiscal year u
(
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u VAT ) can be generally expressed as
(1) ) ( , , , , ,
1













u j u N
g
u j u R
g
u i u N
g





u Z I t I t K t K t K t
1
, , , , , , , , ,
1
, ) ( ) ( ϕ δ γ β α
∑ ∑
= =




u j u N
o
u j u R
o
u i u N
o





u Z I t I t K t K t K t
1
, , , , , , , , ,
1
, ) ( ) ( ϕ δ γ β α
∑ ∑
= =




u j u N
f
u j u R
f
u i u N
f





u Z I t I t K t K t K t
1
, , , , , , , , ,
1
, ) ( ) ( ϕ δ γ β α
∑ ∑
= =




u j u N
h
u j u R
h
u i u N
h





u Z I t I t K t K t K t
1
, , , , , , , , ,
1
, ) ( ) ( ϕ δ γ β α
∑ ∑
= =




u j u N
l
u j u R
l
u i u N
l





u Z I t I t K t K t K t
1
, , , , , , , , ,
1
, ) ( ) ( ϕ δ γ β α
∑ ∑
= =




u j u N
p
u j u R
p
u i u N
p





u Z I t I t K t K t K t
1
, , , , , , , , ,
1
, ) ( ) ( ϕ δ γ β α
where 
Z t, R t  and  N t  = the net zero, reduced and normal VAT rates; 
u = a given fiscal year;
i = consumptive product or service items (i = 1, 2, ..., n);
j = items of investment goods (j = 1, 2, ..., m);
α, β and γ = the sales shares of consumptive products and services which are taxed
differently (α+β+γ = 1);
δ and ϕ = sales shares of investment goods which are taxed differently (δ+ϕ = 1);
C = final consumption of private households; 
K
g = intermediate consumption of (central and local) governments;
I
g = investment made by (central and local) governments;
K
o = intermediate consumption of non-profit private organisations;
I
o = investment made by non-profit private organisations;
K
f = intermediate consumption of banks and insurance companies;
I
f = investment made by banks and insurance companies;
K
h = intermediate consumption in the market-oriented health service sector;
I
h = investment made in the market-oriented health service sector;8
K
l = intermediate consumption in the sector of house and apartment rental;
I
l = investment made in the sector of house and apartment rental;
K
p = intermediate consumption of other public or non-profit private institutions (like
postal service, lottery, etc.);
I
p = investment made by other public or non-profit private institutions (like postal
service, lottery, etc.).
In the quantification of hypothetical VAT revenues, for example, the component
‘private consumption’ of the national accounts data is differentiated into taxable and
non-taxable (or tax-exempted) categories. As indicated in the national VAT law, the
normal and the reduced rates are then allocated systematically corresponding to the in-
dividual items of private consumption, from which one can calculate the hypothetical
VAT revenues for this area. Yet, it should be borne in mind that the national accounts
data on private consumption are generally expressed in gross terms, which means that
these values already contain the VAT amounts. As a consequence, the so-called gross
VAT rates are used for the calculation purpose instead of the net tax rates.
The gross VAT rate at year u (
*











where tu = the net VAT rate at year u.
In the case that a consumption position cannot be entirely assigned to a VAT rate but
encompasses a number of sub-items which are subject to different tax rates, a weighted
gross rate is implied. The weighting scale for the total position is usually derived from
the different shares of the sub-items in this consumption category (see Table a1 and a2
in Appendix).9
Table 1 Value added tax rates in the EU Member States
(Net) VAT rates in 1996 
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a In this study the quantification for the selected EU Member States is carried out for the years 1994,
1995 and 1996. Due to this reason, the 1996 VAT rates are indicated here.
b In general the reduced rates are imposed on the consumption of agricultural products, foodstuffs,
books, and certain medical and pharmaceutical products and equipment as well as paintings and an-
tiques. Exports are subject to the zero rate.
1) Since 1
 January 1998 only two reduced rates: 8% and 17%.
2) Since 1 January 2000: 19.6%.
3) Since 1 January 2000: 2.1% and 5.5%.
4) Since 1
 April 1998: 16%.
5) The lower reduced rate continuously changed thereafter: 3.3% (1997), 3.6% (1998), 4% (1999), 4.2%
(2000) and 4.3% (2001).
6) Since 1 January 2001: 19%.
7) Since 1 January 1997: 5%.
Source: Gebauer et al. (2002), Möglichkeiten und Risiken der Einführung eines grenzüberschreitenden
Vorsteuerabzugs auf europäischer Ebene, Munich; Europäische Kommission (2002), Generaldirektion
Steuern und Zollunion, Steuerpolitik, DOC/2908/2002 – DE, May 2002; Mennel and Förster (1999),
Steuern in Europa, Amerika und Asien, Herne/Berlin.
Analogously one can also measure the input VAT burden (i.e. on intermediate con-
sumption and investment) of governments, banks and insurance companies, private non-
profit organisations as well as those activities and industries like private lessons, renting
houses and apartments, market-oriented health services, postal services, lotteries, etc.
which are, due to the tax-free (or exempt) sales of goods and services, not subject to the
input tax deduction in most cases. Special tax regimes like the flat rate taxation for
farmers, the taxation of margins for travel agencies, and the SME-specific rule cause
some additional efforts in collecting and elaborating relevant statistics, for these firms
are also allowed to opt for the normal taxation. Furthermore, it should be additionally
taken into account that in many countries the input tax deduction is (fully or partially)10
limited also for taxable private firms when purchasing certain services and durable (in-
vestment) goods like cars and corresponding expenditures for maintenance and repair
work as well as gasoline.
Some quantification difficulties may arise when the territorial scope of the VAT law
does not tally with the territorial reporting area covered by the national accounts (see the
case of Åland Island with the mainland of Finland). The same applies when the VAT
law provides for tax rates that differ by region (see the case of Corsica in France). In
both cases, a precise quantification is possible only if corresponding regional statistics
are available. An additional measuring problem can emerge when certain items are re-
corded in the national accounts which are not connected with purchases of relevance for
VAT purposes (e.g. imputed rents for house or apartment owners), and in particular
when these items are not indicated separately but incorporated into other items, with the
result that a recalculation is hardly possible.
A more serious problem for the quantification of VAT evasion based on national ac-
counts data is caused by the discrepancy between the tax revenues on an origin basis
(i.e. the creation of tax liability) and the collected cash revenues in a given period of
time. The latter differs from the former owing mainly to the factors like payment peri-
ods, back payments and deferred payments. In other words, the calculation of hypo-
thetical revenues for a fiscal year is made on the basis of current national accounts data,
which delivers therefore the sum of VAT revenues on an origin basis for the same year.
In practice however the VAT imposed on household consumption (and on the invest-
ment and intermediate consumption of governments, financial institutions, private non-
profit organisations, etc.) made at the end of December of the preceding year, for exam-
ple, can only be effectively (i.e. in cash terms) transferred by firms to tax authorities in
January of the current year. At present this type of formal VAT collecting process usu-
ally takes approximately a month (see e.g. the case in Germany). As a consequence, a
significant share of tax revenues actually originated from the purchases of goods and
services in December of the preceding year is (in cash terms) collected later and re-
corded as January revenues of the current fiscal year. For the adjustment of such a time-
lag problem the January revenue value of the individual years is thus particularly rele-
vant. Since the monthly amounts of collected tax revenues are hardly ever available for
the investigated EU Member States, a tenth of the preceding year’s revenues on an ori-
gin basis is simply allocated for all countries (except Spain) as the part of the corre11
sponding type of VAT revenues for the current fiscal year.
8 Furthermore, an additional
deduction of 1% of revenues on an origin base of a fiscal year is made in the quantifica-
tion to adequately consider the significance of suspending tax claims caused by bank-
ruptcy and other types of tax waiving of the same year.
9
After the necessary time-lag and minor adjustments mentioned above are made,
hyp
u VAT  is transferred to 
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where φ = the share of suspending tax claims due to bankruptcy and other tax waivings
and ω = the share of VAT revenues of which collection in cash term takes place in the
successive year. In this study these parameters are assumed to be constant over the in-
vestigated years (φ =1% and ω = 10% for all EU countries except Spain with 30%).
As a consequence, the tax collection performance ratio at year u (
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8  Spain is an exception. Regardless of reduced or normal rates, this country increased its VAT rate by
1% in 1995. Due to the three month tax payment period, the collected VAT revenues in 1995 contain
in the first quarter the revenues from the lower taxes (3%, 6% and 15%) and the rest from the higher
ones (4%, 7% and 16%). The corresponding time-lag adjustment is made on the basis of this fact.
9  Such types of statistical adjustment and deductions can be done more accurately by national statistical
offices on the basis of nation-specific method and period of tax payment, seasonal fluctuation of con-
sumption and tax income as well as insight information on bankruptcies and other sorts of tax waiving.12
Major Findings of the Empirical Analyses on VAT Collection Per-
formance and VAT Evasion in Germany and the EU
As shown in Table 2, Germany suffered from a rapid growth of VAT evasion in the
three subsequent years after the introduction of Single Market in 1993: 
eva
u r  derived
from the comparison of the quantified (adjusted) hypothetical and the collected reve-
nues increased from 1.6% (1994) to 7.5% (1996). In part this development can be inter-
preted as the outcome of increased tax evading efforts of German firms (and also
households) which were triggered by the abolition of borders for the intra-EU trade as
well as the insufficient (national and EU-wide) tax control and administration in the
Single Market. More importantly, the relative low evasion ratio of 1994 appears to be
well led by the technical difficulties in collecting VAT emerged at the initial year of the
Single Market. For this reason a more significant (than for other investigated years as-
sumed) share of VAT revenues assigned to the fiscal year 1993 seems to have been ac-
tually collected in the succeeding year. If such a time-lag effect could be adjusted prop-
erly, 
eva
u r  would presumably reach around 4% in 1994.
Table 2 Changes of the adjusted hypothetical and the collected VAT revenues as
well as the ratio of VAT evasion in Germany (1994-2001)
Year hyp








































Source: Calculation of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich.
Since 1996 the annual evasion ratio has fluctuated within a narrow band between 6%
and 8%, although the same rate reached a rather high level of around 10% in 2001. The
decrease in 
eva
u r  from 8.0% (1998) to 6.4% (1999) appeared to be led by the introduc-
tion of the so-called Tax Relief Law (Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002) at the
beginning of 1999, which among others limits the pre-tax refund for firms’ travel ex-
penses and other costs related to the usage of cars for business purposes. This legal
change in tax base mobilised additional VAT revenues in cash term in 1999 (and also in13
2000), of which fiscal effect should also be adequately taken into account for the quanti-
fication of hypothetical tax revenues: these values were officially reported to be € 1.6
and 2.3 billion for the years 1999 and 2000, respectively (Dziadkowski et al., 2002). Yet
these numbers appear to be underestimated and, due in part to this reason, the measured
eva
u r  was relatively low in 1999 and 2000.
Unlike the projected € 2.5 billion growth at the beginning of 2001, Germany’s cur-
rent (collected) VAT revenues decreased by approximately € 2 billion in 2001 and
reached only € 139 billion. Rather surprisingly such a trend was accompanied by an
increase in (macroeconomic) VAT base. The total sum of evasion amounted to about
€ 14 billion in 2001, to which an amount of ca. € 4 billion was contributed by the fast
expansion of the so-called (tax-avoiding) daisy-chain businesses (Karussellgeschäfte)
within the EU (Dziadkowski et al., 2002). Consequently, the German legislative body
installed at the beginning of 2002 an extra liability provision (§ 25d Umsatzsteuergesetz
– UStG) through the law of prohibiting tax avoidance (Steuerverkürzungsbekämp-
fungsgesetz – StVBG) in order to fight, first of all, the establishment of such businesses.
Table 3 Comparison of adjusted hypothetical and collected VAT revenues in the

























































































* For the countries France, Italy and the United Kingdom, annual hypothetical VAT revenues were
calculated by Parsche, Steinherr and Waller (1996) for the period 1991-1993. Their calculation was
based on the old national statistical system prior to the introduction of the European System of Ac-
counts (ESA) in 1995, in which these countries compiled and classified economic data according to
their own rules and definitions. Compared to the cases in France and Italy, the size of shadow econ-
omy was less sufficiently considered and included in the UK when calculating the country’s national
accounts data for the years between 1991 and 1993.
Sources: National accounts and tax revenue statistics of the investigated countries (Eurostat, 1997), Na-
tional Accounts ESA 1980-1995, Luxembourg/Brussels; Calculations of the Ifo Institute for Economic
Research, Munich.14
Table 4 Ratio of tax evasion (
eva



























































* See Table 3.
Sources: National accounts and tax revenue statistics of the investigated countries; Eurostat (1997), Na-
tional Accounts ESA 1980-1995, Luxembourg/Brussels; Calculations of the Ifo Institute for Economic
Research, Munich.
Table 3 and 4 summarise the tax collection performance and the VAT evasion ratio for
the selected EU Member States in the period 1994-1996. For France, Italy and the UK
the corresponding values for the years between 1991 and 1993 are adopted for com-
parative purposes (Parsche, Steinherr and Waller, 1996). Among those investigated na-
tions, Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium had the highest VAT evasion and fraud rates in
the observed years which are derived from the lowest tax collection performance fig-
ures. By contrast, tax evasion appears to be less serious in the Netherlands, Denmark
and the UK, which have recently enjoyed tax collection performance values of around
95% in the same period of time. Furthermore, while the ratio of VAT evasion and fraud
more or less stagnated on a high level in Italy and Greece, the same ratio tended to
slightly decrease in the low tax evasion countries like Denmark and the Netherlands
between 1994 and 1996.
By and large these empirical results correspond well to the major outcomes of the
previous studies by Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2000b) which quantify
the size of the shadow economy (as a percentage of official GDP) in advanced econo-
mies based on the so-called currency demand approach (Table 5).
10 A positive correla
                                           
10  Although the direct correlation between the average VAT evasion ratio in Table 4 and the share of the
shadow economy measured by Schneider and Enste (2000) in Table 5 appears to be less significant
shown in terms of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.003, the strong interrelationship between
the two measures can be well identified, when a simple regression analysis (ignoring the constant c) is
carried out, adopting the latter variable as the dependent and the former as the independent one. In this
case the development of the size of shadow economy in the EU is expressed and also explained as a15
tion between the extent of tax evasion and the level of VAT rates appears to be less dis-
tinct in the investigated years (see the low evasion ratio of Denmark with the high nor-
mal rate of 25% and the vice versa for Spain with 16% in Table 5). To a certain extent,
this finding conflicts with the general argument for broadening the tax base and lower-
ing tax rates to reduce the economic incentive to go underground. Yet it should also be
emphasised, taking the Danish experience as an example, that tax evasion can be effec-
tively reduced by (a) simplifying the administration of various taxes, (b) imposing tough
enforcement, (c) increasing international co-operation for sharing tax information and
(d) building a better information base for tax evasion with resources of statistical office,
ministries of finance and tax authorities, etc.
Table 5 Comparison of the rankings of the 1996 VAT rate level and the average
VAT evasion ratio for 1994-1996 as well as the average shadow economy
size as % of GDP for 1994-1995 in the investigated EU countries
Ranking of the normal
VAT rate in 1996
from highest to lowest
(based on Table 1)
Ranking of the average
VAT evasion ratio for
1994-96 from highest to
lowest *
(based on Table 3)
Ranking of the average shadow
economy size as % of GDP for
1994-95 from highest to lowest










































* The ranking for France, Italy and the United Kingdom is made on the basis of the average VAT eva-
sion ratio for 1991-93.
Source: Table 1 and 4; Schneider and Enste (2000), Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Conse-
quences, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, No. 1, Table 7, p. 104.
                                                                                                                               
regression function of the calculated average VAT evasion ratios with the b-value of 1.08, whereas t =
0.620. Moreover the adjusted determinant value R
2 amounts to 0.789.16
Reasons for Lacking Control Incentives for Macroeconomic Clearing
in Individual EU Member States
In the following it is suggested that the recommended macroeconomic clearing system
seriously suffers from the adverse incentives of the individual EU Member States. Such
a revenue redistribution system will lead to an erosion of national efforts in collecting
VAT and in controlling its evasion properly (Genser, 2002).
11 If the macroeconomic
clearing takes place and different VAT evasion rates prevail in the EU, there will be
some shifts of national VAT revenues caused by the movement from the destination to
the origin principle. The actual (collected) VAT revenues of the member country 1 at
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11  Under the macroeconomic clearing regime, national tax authorities remain responsible for VAT ad-
ministration. According to Genser (2002), the optimum tax collecting effort level is a crucial economic
matter, for higher efforts cause higher costs. The national government will invest an additional euro in
such an effort, as long as tax revenue will rise by one euro or more. This type of marginal incentive
system works if additional tax revenue flows directly back to the national budget. Yet European reve-
nue sharing in the frame of macroeconomic clearing creates a positive fiscal externality setting and for
this reason rational governments tend to be less keen on the carrying-out of intensive tax collection. In
other words the level of VAT collection effort of the individual countries will be inefficiently low,
unless the positive fiscal externalities of national VAT collection are fully internalised. Ceteris paribus
the revenue shortfall will be the higher, the smaller the clearing ratio (i.e. z in equation (10)) for the
country. For instance, if the Dutch VAT administration were able to collect a marginal revenue incre-
ment of € 100, then the consumption-based macroeconomic clearing would increase the country’s
VAT revenue only by € 4 (Genser, 2002).17
The term  u y , 1  shows the share of country 1’s collected VAT revenues at year u as % of







































where the total number of EU Member States s = 15 at present.
Since  u y , 1  will not be any longer known in the case of implementing the origin prin-
ciple, the macroeconomic clearing should be carried out based on the so-called clearing























As a consequence, the VAT revenues to be distributed to the country 1 after the macro-
economic clearing at the year u (
MC
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where 
col
u ORI VAT , 1 ) (  means the current amount of VAT revenues for the country 1 at the
year u, when the origin principle is adopted. 
In addition, the intra-EU delivery of goods from the country 1 to the country 2 will be
subject to tax in the country 2 if the origin principle with the cross-border input-tax re-
imbursement system applies. The transfer of the VAT system will definitely cause cer-
tain changes in VAT revenues for the individual countries and also for total EU reve-
nues, since the tax rate and the control intensity in member states will continue to re-
main quite different. Yet it appears to be hardly possible to measure such revenue
changes that would be contributed by the movement from the destination to the origin
principle. For this reason it is assumed for the further analysis that the total sum of col-
lected VAT revenues on the EU level at u remains unchanged. This assumption would
be satisfied if tax rates were completely harmonised EU-wide. 
(12) ∑ ∑ ∑
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For the country 1 the shift of VAT revenues share in the EU at u caused by the macro-
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=  is the weighted average tax collection performance
ratio for the EU at the year u.





u r r − =1 ) than the weighted average of EU 15 would lose the VAT revenues,
whereas those with a higher evasion ratio would gain through the EU-wide macroeco-
nomic clearing system.19
Conclusion
Ceteris paribus the movement from the destination to the origin principle with the cross-
border pre-tax system would lead to changes in VAT revenues in the individual EU
Member States. Since those countries with trade surplus and higher VAT rates would be
significantly better off, a clearing mechanism is necessary to adjust this type of revenue
imbalance. According to the 1996 proposal of the European Commission, such a redis-
tribution is anticipated to take place based on the share of hypothetical VAT revenues of
the EU countries, of which the sum is basically derived from the national accounts data.
This study quantifies the amount of hypothetical VAT revenues for the individual
countries and compares this sum with the (current) collected revenues in a fiscal year.
The difference between these two types of annual revenues largely determines the ex-
tent of VAT evasion of a country. According to such empirical analyses, Germany had a
relatively strong growth of VAT evasion between 1993 and 1996. This trend was not
only triggered by the increased tax evading opportunities caused by the borderless
Europe and the insufficient national and EU-wide tax control system in a new economic
framework but also largely led by the technical difficulties in collecting VAT, liability
for which was created at the initial year of the Single Market. Consequently a large
share of VAT revenues (assigned to the year 1993) was actually collected in the suc-
ceeding year, which, in turn, contributed to the reduction of the evasion ratio in 1994.
The significant decrease of the same rate in 1999 could be in part explained by the in-
clusion of underestimated increases of hypothetical revenues in the calculation, which
was led by the limitation of the pre-tax refund system for some specific business ex-
penses in the context of the Tax Relief Law 1999/2000/2002. Although the macroeco-
nomic VAT base expanded, Germany’s current (collected) VAT revenues decreased by
around € 2 billion in 2001. As a consequence, the VAT evasion ratio reached 10% at the
same year. About one third of the total evasion amounting to € 14 billion seems to have
originated from the rapidly expanding daisy-chain businesses in the EU.
In the international comparison for the period between 1994 and 1996, countries like
Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium suffered particularly from serious tax evasion and
fraud. By contrast, the average tax collection performance ratio was quite high in the
Netherlands and Denmark. In general these empirical findings correspond well with the
outcomes of a number of previous investigations which quantify the size of the shadow
economy in advanced economies based on different types of approaches. Since the
daisy-chain businesses have continuously grown EU-wide, such a development would
also significantly affect the recent size of VAT evasion in other EU Member States. In
this context the study suggests that the reduction of VAT evasion in member nations to20
an acceptable level is one of the most crucial prerequisites to accomplish the ‘true’
European Single Market equipped with the origin principle.
Yet, this study also underscores that the macroeconomic clearing system will lead to
an erosion of national efforts in collecting VAT and in controlling evasion properly in
the individual EU countries. A member nation with a lower VAT evasion ratio than the
weighted average of EU 15 is likely to lose VAT revenues, while those with a higher
evasion ratio tend to gain through such a supranational redistribution system.
Last but not least, it should be borne in mind that the quantification of hypothetical
VAT revenues and the determination of evasion ratio depend very strongly on the qual-
ity of national accounts data, input-output tables and other relevant official statistics as
well as VAT revenue data available for the individual countries.21
Appendix: Calculation of Hypothetical VAT Revenues — An Example
for Private Consumption in Italy (1991-1993)
Table a1 Final consumption of private households in Italy (1991-1993)
Private consumption including
VAT in billion Italian Lire (ITL)
Gross VAT rates ( 
*
u t  )
in % Statistical positions for 
products & services






Milk, cheese & eggs 
3)
Oil & fat 
4)
Fruit & vegetables













Rent for apartment 
11)








Medical services & hospitals 
16)
Spa stay in clinics 
17)
Purchase of transportation vehicles 
18)
Maintenance costs for transportation
vehicles 
19)




Radio, TV, etc. 
22)






Products & services for hygiene 
26)








































































































































































































30), 31) 889 577 949 270 973 17822
Notes:
1) The sales of beef and pork as well as hams and sausages (ca. 75% of the corresponding  consumption
item) is taxed at the normal VAT rate of 19%. Other types of meat is taxed at the reduced rate of 15%. 
2) Prior to 12.5.1991 fish consumption was generally taxed at the reduced rate of 4% but thereafter at
9%. Yet, for the sales of crabs, shells and oysters (which comprise ca. 10% of the total fish consump-
tion) the VAT rate of 12% applies.
3) For the consumption of fresh milk (ca. 19% of position) and cheese (54% of position) the reduced rate
of 4% is adopted, while the imposed rate amounts to 9% for that of eggs (approximately 8% of posi-
tion) and condensed milk (19% of position).
4) For oil, margarine and butter which comprise 95% of the total sales of position the reduced VAT rate
of 4% applies. The rate of 9% is imposed for the consumption of other types of fatty product (5% of
position).
5) The reduced VAT rate of 9% is adopted for the entire position.
6) The normal VAT rate of 19% is imposed on the sales of mineral water and other types of non-
alcoholic beverages.
7) The reduced VAT rate of 9% applied for wine (55% of the total consumption of alcoholic beverages)
until the end of 1992; the rate changed to 12% in 1993. For beer and spirits (ca. 15% of position) the
normal rate of 19% applies. The sales of different types of sparkling wine (around 10% of position)
was taxed at the increased rate of 38% until the end of 1992, and then its rate was reduced to 19% in
1993.    
8) The normal VAT rate of 19% is adopted for the entire position of which value contains the estimated
consumption of  smuggled tobacco (ca. 10%).
9) The consumption of textiles and wearing apparel was taxed at the reduced rate of  9% in 1991 and
1992, and the rate of 12% applies for 1993. Maintenance and repair expenses (approximately 44% of
position) are subject to tax at 19%. The increased rate of 38% applied for fur products (1% of position)
was abolished at the end of 1992, of which consumption is taxed instead at the rate of 19% in 1993.  
10) Until 30.4.1991 the reduced rate of  9% was adopted but the rate changed to 12% thereafter. However,
shoe repairs (10% of position) are subject to the normal VAT rate of 19%.  
11) Approximately 75% of the item is tax-free. For water consumption, etc. (ca. 10% of position) the re-
duced rate of  9% is allowed, while the rest (incl. maintenance expenses) is subject to VAT at 19%.  
12) Around 40% of position which consists of the consumption of  electricity and also partly gas and coal
is subject to tax at the reduced rate of 9%. For the rest of position (central heating and other types of
fuel) the normal rate of 19% applies.
13) House furnishing work (10% of position) is tax-free. The tax rate imposed on the consumption of
textiles, bedclothes, etc. which are required for interior decoration (5% of position) was changed from
9% to 12% in mid-May 1991. Otherwise, the normal rate applies. For the consumption of oriental car-
pets (1% of position) the increased rate of 38% was adopted until the end of 1992. 
14) The sales of medical and pharmaceutical products are generally subject to tax at the reduced rate of
9%. The consumption of some special medicaments (estimated to be ca. 5% of position) is taxed at the
normal rate of 19%. Since 1993 the normal VAT rate applies also for homeopathic products (5% of
position).
15) For the 50% of the sales of therapeutic instruments the reduced rate of 4% is adopted, while the rest is
subject to VAT at the normal rate of 19%. 
16) Medical care and services in hospitals are tax-free.
17) Spa services provided by private clinics are often taxed at the normal rate of 19%.   
18) The consumption of luxury cars (ca. 5% of position) was subject to tax at the rate of 38% until the end
of 1992. Otherwise, the normal rate of 19% applies for the item.
19) The expenses for insurance (23% of position) is tax-free. The normal VAT rate of 19% applies for the
rest.
20) Approximately 65% of  position is tax-free. For carriage of passengers by ship and train (20% of posi-
tion) the reduced rate of  9% is adopted, while the VAT rate of 12% applies for passenger transporta-
tion by aeroplane (15% of position) since 1993.
21) Telephone costs (approximately 89% of position) are taxed at the reduced rate of 9%, while the postal
services (10% of position) are tax-free. For other communication services (1% of position) the normal
rate of 19% is adopted.23
22) The entire position is subject to VAT at 19%, since the consumption share of records, cassette tapes,
etc. appears to be rather negligible which was, however, taxed at the reduced rate of 9% until the mid-
May of 1991 and 12% thereafter.
23) The consumption of entire position is liable to VAT at the reduced rate of 4%.
24) There is no VAT on the education expenses. 
25) For cinema, theatre and sport events (60% of position) the reduced rate of  9% is allowed. The VAT of
4% is imposed on the radio and TV licence fee (20% of position). For the rest of position the normal
rate of 19% is adopted.
26) The consumption of normal soap (20% of position) was liable to VAT at the reduced rate of 9% until
the end of 1992. Otherwise the 19% rate applies.
27) For the stay in luxury hotels (2% of position) the normal rate of 19% is adopted. The rest is subject to
tax at the reduced rate of  9%.
28) Banks and insurance services are free from VAT.
29) Lotteries and other similar types of wager (30% of position) are tax-free. For the rest of position the
normal rate of 19% applies. 
30) The Italian national accounts system adopts the so-called domestic concept which is a method of de-
termining value added of an economic area, irrespective of whether goods and services are produced
by residents or not.
31) The input tax burden for those Italian farmers whose purchase of agricultural goods are subject to
VAT but their sales are exempt from the same tax is estimated to be ca. 7% of their total production
value. Therefore, the hypothetical tax revenues from the intermediate consumption and investment of
this type of farmers ought to be calculated additionally but such a measurement is not made in the
context of the study. Instead, since the tax rates for varied agricultural goods generally amount to (not
0% but) 4% or 9% in Italy, it can be assumed that the extent of extra revenues yielded for the final
consumption of different agricultural items largely corresponds to that of anticipated input tax burden
of those farmers.
Source: Parsche, Steinherr and Waller (1996), Ursprungslandprinzip and Clearing bei der Mehrwertsteuer
– ein makroökonomischer Ansatz, ifo Studien zur Finanzpolitik 61, Munich.24
Table  a2 The calculated hypothetical VAT revenues from final consumption of
Italian private households (1991-1993)







Milk, cheese & eggs 
Oil & fat 
Fruit & vegetables







Rent for apartment 
Electricity & fuel 
Furniture 
Medical & pharmaceutical products 
Therapeutic instruments 
Medical services & hospitals 
Spa stay in clinics 
Purchase of transportation vehicles 
Maintenance costs for transportation vehicles 
Charge for transportation services 
Communication service 
Radio, TV, etc. 
Books, magazines & newspapers
Education 
Cultural events 
Products & services for hygiene 
Hotels & restaurants 
Financial services  

































































































Total 86 672.0 92 948.3 93 895.0
Source: Parsche, Steinherr and Waller (1996), Ursprungslandprinzip and Clearing bei der Mehrwertsteuer
– ein makroökonomischer Ansatz, ifo Studien zur Finanzpolitik 61, Munich.
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